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In Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects (1983), Crispin Wright pro-
posed replacing Frege’s inconsistent Basic Law V,
Basic Law V: Ext(X) = Ext(Y) ´ "x(X(x) ´ Y(x))
with the following abstraction axiom for cardinal numbers:
Hume: #X = #Y ´ X  Y
Here, X and Y are understood as classes, or concepts, or higher-order
entities which are not first-order objects, and the formula X  Y expresses,
in the dyadic second-order language, the equinumerosity of X and Y. The
first-order entity #X is the cardinal number associated with X. This axiom
is sometimes called Hume’s Principle and the formal system obtained by
adding (Hume) to the second-order logic is called Frege Arithmetic. Dis-
cussing Wright’s work, Burgess (1984), Hodes (1984) and Hazen (1985)
noted that Frege Arithmetic has a (countable) model, and it was subse-
quently verified (by Boolos 1986/7, 1987, and others) that second-order
arithmetic Z2 is interpretable within Frege Arithmetic.
In 1989 Boolos proposed a weakened modification of Basic Law V,
New V: Ext*(X) = Ext*(Y) ´ [S(X) ⁄ S(Y) Æ "x(X(x) ´ Y(x))]
where the formula S(X) expresses that X is ‘small’: that is, X is not equinu-
merous with the universe V of first-order entities. That is, S(X) is short for
ÿ(X  V). The idea here is to implement the basic ‘limitation of size’ intu-
ition – sets are (or correspond to) classes which aren’t too big. Boolos
referred to such first-order entities as Ext*(X) as ‘subtensions’. As Boolos
went on to show, the set theory based on (New V) is consistent, but sur-
prisingly weak. For example, it does not prove the axiom of infinity or the
power set axiom.
For entertainment, consider the analogous modification of (Hume):
Small Hume: #X = #Y ´ [S(X) ⁄ S(Y) Æ X  Y]
At first sight, one would guess that (Small Hume) is weaker than (Hume).
However, we have:
sol (Hume) ´ (Small Hume)
For the fi direction, assume (Hume) and suppose (Small Hume) fails.
Then there are classes X, Y such that either (i) #X = #Y, and either X or Y
is small, but ÿ(X  Y); or (ii) #X π #Y and if either X or Y is small, then
X  Y. In case (i) we have #X π #Y, from (Hume), a contradiction. In case
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(ii), ÿ(X  Y), from (Hume). Thus, neither X nor Y is small. Hence, both
are equinumerous with V and thus to each other, so X  Y. Contradiction.
For the ‹ direction, assume (Small Hume) and suppose (Hume) fails.
Then there are classes X, Y such that either (i) #X = #Y and ÿ(X  Y) or
(ii) #X π #Y and X  Y. In case (i), from (Small Hume), if either X or Y is
small, then X  Y. Hence, neither X nor Y is small. Again, both are equinu-
merous with V and so X  Y. Contradiction. In case (ii), (Small Hume)
entails that either X or Y is small, and ÿ(X  Y). Contradiction.1
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1 Richard Heck pointed out to me that this simple result hinges on the fact that in such
theories there exists a ‘rogue object’ (viz. #V), which here corresponds to the size of
the universe V.
